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Daniella Casseres* 
 
South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC: 
Investors’ Desperate Plea for Second Circuit 
Standards 
 
 
In South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC,1 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether South Cherry 
Street, an investment fund, could bring a securities fraud claim against its 
investment adviser, Hennessee Group, for recommending that the fund 
invest in a Ponzi scheme.2  The Second Circuit dismissed South Cherry 
Street’s securities fraud claim because South Cherry Street failed to plead 
sufficient facts to meet the scienter requirement.3 The Court erred in finding 
that South Cherry Street did not meet the scienter requirements 
promulgated under Rule 10b-5 or the Second Circuit because Hennessee 
Group’s failure of duty to monitor established scienter.4 Despite the Court’s 
failure to find scienter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated the 
right standard, which should be followed by other circuits because it strikes 
the appropriate balance between deterring fraud and preventing illegitimate 
claims.5  
 
 
 
© 2011 Daniella Casseres 
*  J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Maryland School of Law. 
 1. 573 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 2. Id. at 99–100. 
 3. See id. at 104, 114 (holding that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals saw no error in the 
rulings of the district court, and dismissing South Cherry Street’s claims).  
 4. See infra Part V.A.,B. 
 5. Id.; See infra Part V. 
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II. The Case 
A. Factual Background  
 
In 2001, investment advisers, Hennessee Group LLC (“Hennessee”), gave a 
presentation to inexperienced hedge fund investors, South Cherry Street, 
LLC (“South Cherry”), describing its process for evaluating and 
recommending hedge funds.6  In its presentation, Hennessee discussed its 
due diligence7 process before recommending a fund, and its on-going due 
diligence after recommending a fund to an investor.8 South Cherry and 
Hennessee entered into an oral agreement9 whereby Hennessee would 
recommend suitable hedge fund investments to South Cherry that passed 
Hennessee’s due diligence evaluation.10 Hennessee also agreed to provide 
ongoing due diligence on funds that it recommended to South Cherry.11  In 
exchange, South Cherry agreed to pay Hennessee an annual commission of 
1% of each investment made as a result of Hennessee’s recommendation.12 
Hennessee suggested that South Cherry invest in a hedge fund named 
Bayou Accredited (“Bayou”).13   
 6. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 100.  
7. Hennessee’s  
[D]ue diligence process with respect to such funds included the following five levels of 
scrutiny prior to its recommendation of such a fund for investment: (1) collection of 
information about the fund's manager; (2) assessment of the fund's ‘Experience,’ 
‘Credibility,’ and ‘Transparency’; (3) interviews of hedge fund ‘[p]ersonnel from the 
top down" at the fund's offices to give HG a sense of "overall professionalism, attitude 
and depth of organization’; (4) study of the fund's ‘[i]ndividual positions,’ with an 
emphasis on its long, short, cash, and derivative positions, as well as any ‘[o]ff balance 
sheet transactions’; and (5) review of ‘audited financial statements,’ checks of the 
fund's key personnel's references, confirmation of the fund's prime banking 
relationship, and measures to "Verify Auditor.’ 
 Id.   
 8. Id. at 100–01.  
 9. Id. at 101. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that this agreement was not a 
legally enforceable contract pursuant to the New York Statute of Frauds because it could not be 
performed within one year. Id. at 108. 
 10. Id. at 101. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that this agreement was not a 
legally enforceable contract pursuant to the New York Statute of Frauds because it could not be 
performed within one year. Id. at 108. 
 11. Id. at 101.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 100. 
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Hennessee represented to South Cherry that Bayou’s “legendary” 
trader, Samuel Israel III, had been a principal at another large hedge fund, 
Omega Investments.14  Hennessee also told South Cherry that Bayou was 
independently audited by Hert Herson & Co.15  South Cherry invested 
$1.15 million in Bayou between the spring of 2003 and the spring of 2005 
based on the recommendation of Hennessee.16  Hennessee sent South 
Cherry monthly reports as to the status of their investment in Bayou, the 
last of which stated that South Cherry’s investment had appreciated from  
$ 1.15 million to about $ 1.5 million.17 
In September 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) reported that Bayou was part of a Ponzi scheme.18 Bayou had lost 
millions of dollars and had lied to investors about “the [f]und’s performance 
and the value of investors’ accounts.”19 South Cherry lost its $1.15 million 
investment in Bayou.20 All of Hennessee’s representations to South Cherry 
about the Bayou Fund were false.21 Samuel Israel III was not a head trader 
at Omega Investments.22 Hert Herson & Co. had not been Bayou’s auditor 
since 1998, and the new auditor was not independent because Bayou’s 
principals owned the auditor.23 Bayou had consistently lost money during 
the period that South Cherry invested in the Fund.24  
 
 
 
 14. Id.  at 101.  
 15. Id. at 102–03. 
 16. Id. at 101–02.  
 17. Id. at 102.  
 18. Id. A Ponzi scheme is when a fund promoter pays returns to existing investors from funds 
contributed by new investors, and the fund has little to no legitimate earnings from which it is 
paying returns to existing investors. Ponzi Schemes— Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). Ponzi 
schemes generally collapse when the fund has no new investors or many investors decide to cash 
out of the fund simultaneously. Id. 
 19. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 102.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. Israel has been a mere order taker at Omega Investments. Id. 
 23. Id. at 103. Bayou’s principal, Daniel Marino, was also a principal of Richmond, Fairfield 
& Associates, and the firm that audited Bayou in 2003. Id.  
 24. See id. at 102 (stating that “[t]he SEC reported that ‘Bayou Fund in fact lost millions of 
dollars in every single year it traded.’”).  
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B. Procedural History 
 
South Cherry brought a securities fraud claim in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York under § 10(b)25 and Rule 10b-5 of 
Securities and Exchange Act of 193426 against Hennessee “for 
misrepresenting the financial status and performance of the Bayou funds.”27 
The district court dismissed the claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), 
finding that the investors failed to plead scienter.28 The district court held 
that South Cherry failed to establish that Hennessee knew of the Ponzi 
scheme or that Hennessee intended to deceive South Cherry, and therefore 
did not meet the standard of conscious recklessness or fraudulent intent 
necessary to plead securities fraud.29 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that South 
Cherry failed to meet the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”)’s  heightened pleading standards.30 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 set up 
the most basic legal standard for a plaintiff’s cause of action in a securities 
fraud claim.31 Additionally, in 1976 the Supreme Court in Ernst v. 
Hochfelder32 required the plaintiff to show scienter, which it defined as the 
intent to deceive, defraud or manipulate.33 Since then, the scienter 
requirement has evolved differently in various circuits.34 In 1995, Congress 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq (2000).  
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).  
 27. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 103.   
 28. Id.  
 29. In re Bayou Hedge Fund Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 405, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 30. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d. at 104. 
 31. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that SEC 
Rule 10b-5 “delineates what constitutes a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”).  
 32. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 33. Id. at 193. 
 34. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1999)  (stating that 
numerous courts have considered the PSLRA pleading standard issue with split results); In re 
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA 
imposes more heightened pleading standards than the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA standards); 
Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537–38 (2d Cir.1999)(holding that the PSLRA 
codified Second Circuit standards; Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th 
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passed the PSLRA,35 the interpretation of which is still controversial among 
different circuits.36   
 
A. §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 Give 
Plaintiffs a Private Cause of Action to Bring a Securities Fraud Claim 
 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 work 
in conjunction to regulate the disclosure of securities information to 
investors.37 The Securities Act of 1933 seeks to provide disclosure about 
securities that are sold in interstate and foreign commerce.38 The purpose of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to regulate securities exchanges39 
and over-the-counter markets40 on which securities are sold.41 The 
Cir.1997) (holding that the PSLRA codified Second Circuit standards); Voit v. Wonderware 
Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D.Pa.1997) (stating that the District Court for the Third Circuit 
believed The PSLRA imposed more stringent pleading standards than the Second Circuit 
approach).  
 35. 104 Pub. 67, 109 Stat. 737.  
 36. See infra note 70.   
 37. As defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a security is: 
[a]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest 
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral 
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, reorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate 
of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, 
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or 
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into 
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any 
instrument commonly known as a ‘security’; or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any 
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of 
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal 
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006). 
 38. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§77a–77aa 
(2006)). 
 39. A securities exchange is a financial market where securities are traded. Glossary, 
VIVENDI, http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/Glossary (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).  
 40. A security traded in some context other than on a formal exchange is referred to as a 
trading in an “over-the counter” market. INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com 
/terms/o/otc.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). “[O]ver-the-counter can be used to refer to stocks 
that trade via a dealer network as opposed to on a centralized exchange. It also refers to debt 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 enforces disclosure requirements for 
regulated securities.42 Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC, implements § 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which allows individuals to 
hold corporations liable for engaging in deceptive practices by giving the 
SEC the ability to civilly prosecute anyone who makes an untrue statement 
or who omits “to state a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.”43 Case law proscribes a private cause of action for a 
plaintiff to bring a securities fraud claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.44 A 
plaintiff may bring a private action if he can plead that: (1) a defendant 
made a false representation of a material fact or omitted material 
information; (2) the plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation; and (3) the 
defendant acted with scienter.45   
 
1. Materiality 
 
A fact is material if a reasonable investor would consider it important in 
making an investment decision.46 There must be a substantial likelihood 
that the misrepresented or omitted fact would have altered an investor’s 
decision.47 A court may look outside of the complaint in order to determine 
securities and other financial instruments such as derivatives, which are traded through a dealer 
network.” Id. 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq. (2006). 
 42. See supra note 40. 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 305–06 (2d Cir. 
2000)(noting how Rule 10b-5 specifies actions prohibited by the 1934 Act, such as making “any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. . . .” 
Individuals have a private right of action to bring their own securities fraud cases under SEC Rule 
10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). The SEC, however, also has the ability to bring civil cases 
against securities offenders on behalf of individuals affected by fraud. Novak, 216 F.3d at 305–06. 
 44. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (holding that a private cause of 
action for damages exists under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but only with an allegation of intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud). 
 45. See id. at 202 (stating that Rule 10(b) requires conduct involving scienter).  
 46. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (holding that public statements 
denying merger negotiations and denying any corporate developments that would account for 
heavy trading activity in its stock were material to investors who decided to sell their stock after 
the public denials).  
 47. Id. (noting how there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been considered by the reasonable investor as significantly altering the “total 
mix” of information made available). 
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the importance of information to a reasonable investor.48 In determining 
materiality, a court weighs the probability that an event will occur and the 
anticipated magnitude of the event “in light of the totality of company 
activity.”49 If the magnitude of an event would have immediate importance 
to investors regardless of whether or not the event ultimately takes place, 
the information surrounding the event is material.50 This means that 
materiality is determined on a case by case basis.51  
 
2. Reliance 
 
A successful 10b-5 claim must show reasonable reliance on the material 
misrepresentation.52 As set forth in Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 53 
reasonable reliance requires “a causal nexus between a misrepresentation or 
omission and the plaintiff’s injury” and a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
reasonable person standing in his or her shoes would have relied on the 
misrepresentation or omission.54 In testing reasonable reliance, courts may 
consider: 
 
(1) whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties; 
(2) whether the plaintiff had the opportunity to detect the fraud; 
(3) the sophistication of the plaintiff; (4) the existence of long 
 48. See Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D.C.N.Y. 1984) (considering 
documents outside of the complaint to determine whether an amended complaint fairly stated a 
claim under Rule 10b-5 because the documents were central to the allegations of wrongdoing, had 
been submitted on defendant’s original motion, and had not been questioned in terms of their 
authenticity and accuracy). 
 49. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).  
 50. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 451 (1976) (noting that the standard 
“does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
caused the reasonable investor to change his vote”). In TSC Indus., Inc., Defendant omitted 
material facts relating to the degree of National's control over TSC. Id. at 442. Defendant failed to 
disclose the positions in TSC held by National's president and executive vice president, and 
reports filed with the SEC by National and TSC indicating that National may be deemed a 
“parent” of TSC. Id. at 451. 
 51. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F. 2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that each 
case must be approached on its own facts). 
 52. See Straub v. Vaisman and Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 597–98 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that 
scrutiny of the plaintiff’s actions are in the context of materiality, reliance, and reasonableness).   
 53. See Paracord Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 54. Id. 
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standing business or personal relationships; and (5) the 
plaintiff’s access to the relevant information.55  
 
Additionally, in securities fraud cases, reliance is presumed based on 
the fraud-on-the-market theory, 56 which assumes that the market price 
relied on by investors reflects any material misrepresentations or 
omissions.57 Therefore, plaintiffs do not need to show that they 
personally relied on the defendant’s fraudulent statements.58 Reliance 
may also be presumed if a 10b-5 claim is based on a failure to disclose 
information.59 However, this presumption only applies if the failure to 
disclose involves an omission of fact “as opposed to affirmative 
misrepresentations.”60 A plaintiff’s failure to disclose a fraudulent 
scheme may be regarded as an omission that creates the presumption of 
reliance.61 
 
3. Scienter 
 
Scienter is the “intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”62 This requisite 
state of mind implies that at the time that a defendant made an alleged 
misrepresentation or omission, he or she had knowledge or a reasonable 
 55. See Straub, 540 F.2d at 598 (finding reasonable reliance when an investor invested based 
on the recommendation of a securities broker). The court stated that even a sophisticated investor 
“is not barred by a claim of reliance upon the honesty of those with whom he deals in the absence 
of knowledge that the trust is misplaces.” Id. The court also stated that “knowing that [the 
plaintiff] had confidence in [the broker], [the broker] abused this trust to promote a transaction 
with which otherwise would have been received with caution.” Id. 
 56. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988). 
 57. See id. at 224 (1988) (creating a presumption of investor reliance based on the theory that 
investors presumably rely on the market price, which typically reflects the misrepresentation or 
omission); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding 
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the purpose of courts’ use of the “fraud 
on the market” theory). 
 58. See Basic, 485. U.S. at 246, 249.  
 59. See generally Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).  
 60. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 61. The fact that investors signed certain clauses in transaction documents may render 
reliance unreasonable as a matter of law. See AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 179 
(3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court found clauses discharging warranties as to the 
accuracy or completeness of information renders reliance unreasonable).  
 62. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
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suspicion of fraud.63 If a defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a 
securities fraud solely by inaction, the plaintiff must also prove that the 
defendant had knowledge or should have had knowledge of fraud.64 
Similarly, the courts hold that a defendant’s failure to monitor must be 
accompanied by an intent to aid in the fraud in order meet the scienter 
requirement.65 
 
B. The PSLRA Codified the Second Circuit’s Pleading Standards and 
Imposed Additional Requirements to Heighten Pleading Standards 
 
In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA66 to limit frivolous securities law 
suits brought by individuals in response to the growing number of meritless 
securities fraud suits seeking to attain quick settlements.67 Congress 
addressed the problem through heightened pleading standards,68 which 
makes cases more likely to get dismissed for failure to meet pleading 
requirements, and protects corporations from high volumes of litigation any 
time a corporation’s stock price decreased.69 The PSLRA set a baseline of a 
“strong inference” requirement for scienter;70 however, since the PSLRA 
did not define how to prove a “strong inference” the definition of scienter 
under the PSLRA has been hotly debated among different circuits.71  
 
 
 
 
 63. Id. at 197 (stating that “[t]he words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction with 
‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or 
intentional misconduct”).  
 64. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir. 1974).  
 65. See Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a 
non-fiduciary accountant will only be liable for securities fraud if his reckless conduct 
approximates an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetuated by an audited company).  
 66. See S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.  104–67, 109 Stat. 737, 
747 (1995) (stating that the plaintiff must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).   
 71. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000); see supra note 40. 
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1. Pleading Scienter Pre-PSLRA 
 
Prior to the PSLRA, the Supreme Court in Ernst v. Ernst72 held that in 
order to bring a claim under 10(b) and 10b-5, a plaintiff had to prove more 
than mere negligence.73 The Second Circuit enabled a plaintiff to prove 
scienter by pleading facts that gave rise to an inference of either a 
defendant’s fraudulent intent or recklessness.74 Prior to Congress passing 
the PSLRA, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs must allege facts that 
give rise to a strong inference of scienter.75 An inference of fraudulent 
intent could be drawn from facts showing that the plaintiff had a motive and 
opportunity to commit the fraud.76 This could be shown by the defendant 
gaining a benefit from the purported fraud.77 According to Second Circuit’s 
pre-PSLRA standards, a plaintiff could show a strong inference of scienter 
by alleging that defendants “benefitted in a concrete and personal way from 
the fraud, engaged in deliberately illegal behavior, knew facts or had access 
to information suggesting that their public statements were not accurate, or 
failed to check information that they had a duty to monitor.”78 For example, 
in Goldman v. Belden,79 plaintiffs demonstrated defendants’ fraudulent 
intent by showing that defendants made false statements to inflate a 
 72. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).  
 73. Id. at 210 (holding that "judicially created private damages remedy under §10(b) . . . 
cannot be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent 
wrongdoing."). 
 74. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 75. Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that a “strong 
inference” of fraudulent intent could not be deduced from the results of prior inspections because 
prior inspections had stated that the company was doing well. Thus defendant’s statements about 
high prospects for the company could have been made in reliance of prior inspections.). 
 76. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Regulation, 9 F.3d 259, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting 
that one way that a plaintiff can plead scienter without direct knowledge of the defendant’s state 
of mind is “to allege fact establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so”). 
 77. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that pre-
PSLRA pleading standards describe “[m]otive [as] . . . entail[ing] concrete benefits that could be 
realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged”). 
 78. See id. (stating that pre-PSLRA pleading standards describe motive as concrete benefits 
that could be realized by false statements or wrongful disclosures, and opportunity means the 
likely prospect of achieving these concrete benefits); In Re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 270 (finding 
that motive was proven when defendants talked up the price of the company’s stock in order to 
soften the dilution of the stock price). 
 79. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).  
     
D C
 VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011                                                                                       241 
company’s stock price and defendants would benefit concretely from higher 
stock prices because they owned company stock.80  
After Goldman, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs must make 
specific factual allegations before a court will presume that incorrect 
predictions about a company, such as predictions about inflation of stock 
price, are made with fraudulent intent.81 In addition, the Second Circuit in 
Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc.,82 emphasized that in order to allege a 
strong inference of intent, defendants must have benefitted personally.83 
For example, defendants may benefit concretely by misrepresenting 
information in order to keep the stock price of the corporation high while 
selling their own shares for profit.84 In Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.,85 
the Second Circuit held that the fact that some people in a company 
received compensation as a result of a misrepresentation to an investor 
regarding a loan portfolio does not satisfy the motive and opportunity 
element necessary to prove scienter.86 However, if management were to 
misrepresent loan portfolio values in order to sell their own shares before a 
price decrease, this direct economic benefit would satisfy the motive 
requirement.87  
While the First and Seventh Circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning of the “strong inference” requirement,88 the Ninth and Sixth 
Circuits did not require a strong inference to satisfy the scienter 
requirement.89 Rather, prior to the PSLRA, scienter was inferred by 
 80. Id. at 1070.   
 81. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1131.  
 82. 174 F. 3d 79 (2d. Cir. 1999).  
 83. Id. at 85.   
 84. Id. (discussing allegation that defendant corporation officer sold off large portions of his 
stockholdings during the time of misrepresentations as probative of motive and supporting a string 
inference of fraudulent intent). 
 85. 25 F.3d at 1130.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that a complaint 
must set forth specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that a defendant knew that a 
statement was materially false or misleading); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (stating that a plaintiff’s conclusory statements alleging defendant’s actual knowledge 
of the materially false and misleading statements and omissions or reckless disregard for the truth 
were not a sufficient showing). 
 89. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994); See Leoni v. Rogers, 
719 F. Supp. 555, 568 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that securities fraud claims must state “the 
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pleading fraud with particularity that a fact was false or misleading.90 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “plaintiffs may 
aver scienter generally. . . that is, simply by saying that scienter existed.”91 
It was sufficient to allege that scienter existed without setting out the 
circumstances from which it could be inferred.92 Nevertheless, in order to 
allege scienter it was necessary to set out circumstances indicating that a 
defendant made a false or misleading statement by stating what was false 
about a statement and why it was false.93 Plaintiffs satisfied this 
requirement by setting forth the false statement and offering 
contemporaneous statements proving the inaccuracy of the statement.94 
The Second Circuit held that conscious recklessness could be proven 
by showing that the defendant knew or should have known of the fraud.95 
For example, in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc.96 the plaintiff met 
scienter when he presented evidence showing that the defendant had 
assured him that his investment securities were satisfactory despite being 
circumstances constituting fraud with particularity” and that “[m]alice, intent knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally”).  
 90.  Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled securities fraud by alleging with particularity that the Company’s SEC 
reports had misrepresented the company’s losses. The court did not discuss motive and 
opportunity or recklessness. The plaintiffs alleged:   
that prior to the April 2 announcement, the Company and three of its top-ranking 
officers intentionally misrepresented the financial condition of the Company, in 
particular its expansion program's prospects for enhancing the Company's earnings. The 
Complaint cite[d] various public statements-either prepared by the Company itself 
(Shareholder Reports, Form 10-Qs, Form 10-K, newspaper interviews) or prepared by 
securities analysts with the approval and guidance of the Company-and allege[d] that 
these statements created the impression that the Company was successfully expanding 
its retail warehouse operations when, in fact, the Company's expansion program was 
failing. 
See also In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1545–47(finding that plaintiffs may plead scienter 
generally by merely requiring that the complaint state that scienter existed).  
 91. In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1546. 
 92. Id. at 1545.  
 93. Id. at 1548. 
 94. Id. at 1550 (finding that plaintiffs satisfied the scienter element by pleading that an 
issuer’s SEC filing stating no net losses on sales of its subsidiaries was false and by offering as 
proof of falsity, contemporaneous statements, made at board meetings, indicating that the 
environment for sale of its subsidiaries was unfavorable).  
 95. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding 
that reckless disregard of facts that defendant should have known, but for failure of duty to 
monitor, satisfied scienter).  
 96. 570 F.2d at 38.  
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aware that the quality of securities being purchased on behalf of his client 
were very low and the defendant’s constant interaction with the purchaser 
of securities was such that he had the opportunity to inquire or check on the 
validity of the purchases.97 The Second Circuit  found that the pleading 
standard for scienter was met under the guise of conscious recklessness 
when the plaintiff alleged that his investment adviser had a duty to monitor 
and “the investment adviser responsible for the plaintiff’s portfolio ‘knew 
what he was doing’ but never actually investigated” the funds he was 
recommending for investment.98 In Rolf, an investor’s broker “by virtue of  
repeatedly reassuring the investor of his confidence in an investor adviser 
who was mishandling the investor’s portfolio and by virtue of his reckless 
disregard as to whether his assurances of confidence were true or false” 
participated in the investment adviser’s securities fraud.99 
 
2. Pleading Scienter Post PSLRA 
 
Congress enacted the PSLRA as a reaction to an increasing number of 
“strike suits”100 arising in circuit courts that brought undesirable social and 
economic costs.101 The PSLRA heightened securities fraud pleading 
standards by requiring that plaintiffs allege a “strong inference” of scienter 
with “particularity of facts,”102 and that the inference of scienter must be at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference of non fraudulent 
behavior.103 
 97. Id. Plaintiffs did not plead fiduciary duty; however, the District Court stated that it was 
clear “that fraud and breach of fiduciary duty [were] present.” Rolf, 424 F.Supp. at 1024. 
Defendant by virtue of being a broker dealer owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff investor. Id. at 
1036.  
 98. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47–48.  
 99. Id. at 44.  
 100. Strike suits are law suits filed with the intention of inducing quick and large settlements 
from corporations, which were eager to settle rather than incur the litigation costs. See Blue 
ChipStamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740–42 (1975).  
 101. See S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 4 (1995). 
102. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2nd Cir. 2000).  
103. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007) (holding 
that “[t]o determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts giving rise to the requisite 
‘strong inference’, a court must consider plausible nonculpable explanations for the 
defendant's conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff. The inference that the 
defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, but it must be more than merely 
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a. Particularity 
 
To survive a motion to dismiss a securities fraud claim, the plaintiff’s 
claims may not be merely conclusory.104 For example, in Eurycleia 
Partners, Limited Partnership v. Seward Kissel, 105 the New York Court of 
Appeals found the plaintiff’s claim that a defendant law firm committed 
fraud was conclusory because it lacked any firm factual findings relevant to 
the defendant’s knowledge of any fraudulent scheme.106 In order to support 
a statement with particularity, a plaintiff must specify each statement that is 
misleading, the reasons it is misleading, and facts that support the belief 
that a statement is misleading.107 In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, 
Inc.,108 the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff would sufficiently plead 
that a defendant’s statements were misleading by stating the facts that 
misled a plaintiff into investing in a defendant’s business, contrasting the 
real factual circumstances with a defendant’s representations, and giving 
references and sources concerning a defendant’s mental state.109 
 
b. At Least as Compelling as Opposing Inferences 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court in Tellabs v. Makor110 held that pleadings 
will only survive the “strong inference” requirement if a reasonable person 
would consider an inference of scienter at least as plausible as an inference 
of innocent behavior from the facts alleged.111 Courts look at all the facts of 
a case, not just an individual allegation, in determining whether an 
inference of scienter is compelling.112 The Court in Tellabs found that the 
absence of motive allegations and the failure to plead with particularity 
allegations of the company flooding its customers with unwanted products 
‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of 
other explanations.”).  
 104. Eurycleia Partners, Ltd. P’ship v. Seward Kissel, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 558–59. 
 107. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 311–12. 
 108. Id. at 313. 
 109. Id. at 315–17.  
 110. Id. at 311. 
 111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
 112. See Tellabs, 511 U.S. at. 319–20. 
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were not fatal to finding scienter because all allegations must be taken 
collectively, and the plaintiff had sufficiently shown that defendants falsely 
reassured public investors so that their stock price would remain strong.113 
The inference of scienter need not be the most compelling interest.114 It 
only needs to be strong enough that a reasonable person would deem it as 
strong as any opposing inference.115  Information from anonymous sources 
is not deemed as plausible as information derived from known sources.116 
In weighing competing inferences, courts must take into account whether 
plaintiffs allege a scheme that has any chance of achieving its putative 
ends.117 For example, in In re PXRE Group, Ltd., Securities Litigation,118 
the Supreme Court concluded that an inference of scienter was not as 
compelling as other inferences because the defendants’ motivation to 
misstate their losses to raise money and offset deficits would be odd given 
the fact that they were not attempting to raise enough capital to offset their 
entire losses.119 Tellabs requires that a court weigh competing inferences to 
assess the validity of securities fraud claims.120 Nevertheless, while the 
Supreme Court has laid out the procedural requirements for pleading a 
cause of action under the “strong inference” requirement, it has yet to 
clearly define the term.121 Therefore, the requisite state of mind necessary 
to plead scienter remains unclear.122  
 
C. Circuit Split About the Meaning of Strong Inference of Scienter 
 
Although the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead a “strong inference” of 
scienter to survive a motion to dismiss, neither the PSLRA nor the Supreme 
Court have clearly defined the term “strong inference,” resulting in a circuit 
 113. Id. at. 314, 322–23. 
 114. Id. at 310–11.  
 115. Id. at 310. 
 116. Higginbotham v. Baxter Intern., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 117. In re GeoPharma, Inc. Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 432, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that 
opportunity to commit fraud may not exist for an alleged scheme with no chance of success).  
 118. 600 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 119. Id. at 533. 
 120. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.   
 121. See id. 
 122. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the 
ambiguity of the “strong inference” standard that is set out by Congress in the PSLRA).  
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split.123  While all circuits agree that plaintiffs must allege a strong 
inference of intent,124 the requirements for proving a defendant’s state of 
mind vary in different circuits.125 Some circuits require proof of motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud or recklessness, while others require proof of 
deliberate recklessness.126  While the Second Circuit holds that scienter can 
be proven by showing a defendant’s motive and opportunity to commit 
fraud, the Ninth Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant knew 
he was committing fraud.127 The application of varying pleading 
requirements stems from circuits’ differing views on whether the PSLRA 
codified the Second Circuit Court of Appeals scienter analysis or the 
PSLRA created a more rigorous standard than that used by the Second 
Circuit.128 
  
1. The Second and Third Circuits Maintain Pre-PSLRA Understanding 
 
The Second and Third Circuits continue to hold that a plaintiff can establish 
a strong inference by pleading motive and opportunity to commit fraud or 
by showing recklessness.129 Thus, the PSLRA did not alter the Second 
Circuit’s pre-PSLRA interpretation of scienter requirements.130  
 
 123. Id. (acknowledging the circuit split between a “majority of courts” that say the PSLRA 
“essentially codified the Second Circuit’s approach” and other courts that hold that the PSLRA 
“imposes an even more stringent pleading standard”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2000) 
(Courts have disagreed on the proper interpretation of the new pleading requirement . . . in light of 
the text of the PSLRA and its legislative history.”). 
 124. The Supreme Court in Tellabs reiterated the fact that all plaintiffs alleging securities fraud 
must give rise to a strong inference of scienter. 551 U.S. 308, 317–18 (2007). It is also in the plain 
language of the PSLRA statute, as passed by Congress.  Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737.  
 125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 126. See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 530.  
 127. Id. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 988 (1999) (finding no strong 
inference of deliberate recklessness or knowing misrepresentation). 
 128. See Novak, 216 F.3d at 309–10 (“[Courts] have generally come to two conclusions: (1) 
[the PSLRA] effectively adopts the Second Circuit’s pleading standard for scienter wholesale . . . 
[or that] (2) [the PSLRA] strengthens the Second Circuit’s standard by rejecting the simple 
pleading of motive and opportunity.”).  
 129. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit’s holding in Rolf was 
reaffirmed post PSLRA by Nathal v. Siegal, which held that plaintiff’s allegations that a defendant 
had access to internal documents that would have revealed fraud satisfied scienter. 592 F. Supp. 
2d 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 130. In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534. 
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2. Other Circuits Require Pleading Intent with Particularity 
 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress did not intend to codify 
the Second Circuit requirements in the PSLRA.131 Instead, contrary to its 
pre-PSLRA relaxed scienter pleading standards,132 the Ninth Circuit now 
imposes very stringent requirements to prove the defendant’s state of 
mind.133 In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff must plead with great particularity 
facts showing that a defendant acted with deliberate recklessness or 
conscious misconduct.134 For example, in In re Silicon Graphics,135 the 
plaintiff failed to plead deliberate recklessness because she did not mention 
the author of the reports or a description of the contents of reports upon 
which she based her belief of fraud.136 Therefore, the court did not 
conclude that defendants knew they were committing fraud.137 Similarly, 
the Eleventh Circuit requires pleadings that show a defendant’s severe 
recklessness.138 This standard also requires a plaintiff to show that 
defendants were aware they were engaging in fraudulent activity.139 
Finally, the Sixth Circuit holds that plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging 
facts giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness without showing that 
defendants knew their acts were fraudulent; however, the bare pleading of 
 131. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 (holding that the Ninth Circuit interprets the 
PSLRA as requiring a plaintiff to plead evidence of deliberate recklessness or conscious 
misconduct).  See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534–35 (holding that in the Second Circuit it 
remains sufficient to establish motive and opportunity or recklessness).  
 132. The pre-PSLRA Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs could allege scienter 
simply by stating that scienter existed, without even setting forth the circumstances from which it 
could be inferred. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 133. Id. (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs plead deliberate recklessness 
or conscious misconduct).  
 134. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976, 988 (discussing that unless great particularity and 
incriminating facts were pled, the PSLRA would not serve its function of preventing fishing 
expeditions).  
 135. Id. at 970.  
 136. Id. at 988. 
 137. Id. 
 138. McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814–15 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that although the securities at issue may not have had a reasonable basis for achieving 
the plaintiff’s investment goals, unreasonableness or inappropriateness of invested securities does 
not meet a severe recklessness standard).  
 139. Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1998) (finding that 
plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants knew the true value of hotel property when soliciting 
buyers, and therefore did not deliberately or recklessly misrepresent the hotel’s value).  
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motive and opportunity alone does not constitute a strong inference of 
scienter.140  
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In South Cherry Street, Limited Liability Co. v. Hennessee Group Limited 
Liability Co.,141 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s 
dismissal of South Cherry’s securities fraud claim on the basis that South 
Cherry failed to plead scienter.142 Judge Kearse began by explaining that in 
order to state a claim for securities fraud, a plaintiff must plead that a 
defendant made a false representation as to a material fact or omitted 
material information and acted with scienter in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.143  
The Court discussed its interpretation of the scienter requirement 
under the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements.144 The Court stated 
that the plaintiff must state particular facts that give rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant intended to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud” 
to meet the requirement of scienter under the PSLRA.145 The Court 
reasoned that a strong inference of scienter may arise when a complaint 
alleges that the defendants  
 
(1) benefitted in a concrete way and personal way from the 
purported fraud . . .; (2) engaged in deliberately illegal 
behavior. . .; (3) knew facts or had access to information 
suggesting that their public statements were not accurate. . .; or 
(4) failed to check information they had a duty to monitor.146  
 
 140. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F. 3d 542, 551–52 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
fact that defendants would benefit from an increase in stock price was relevant to show 
recklessness, but defendant’s error in recognizing revenue was not so obvious that a reasonable 
man would have known they were in error). 
 141. 573 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 142. Id. at 114. 
 143. Id. at 108.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 110 (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307–09 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
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The Court determined that the defendant’s failure to monitor the fund 
was not sufficient to establish scienter by following the precedent set in 
Decker v. Massey-Ferguson.147 Decker held that a non-fiduciary’s failure to 
identify a company’s internal problems was not sufficient to establish 
scienter.148 In order for a defendant’s failure to monitor a company to 
satisfy the scienter requirement, a defendant would have to fail to monitor 
with the intent of aiding in fraud.149 The Court found that South Cherry 
failed to allege that Hennessee knew that the statements it made were 
untrue, that Hennessee knew of the falsity of the representations it gave 
South Cherry, or that Hennessee should have been alerted to the falsity of 
the representations.150 Therefore, South Cherry failed to plead scienter.151  
The Court qualified a strong inference by applying a comparative 
analysis between the inference of scienter and any opposing inferences of 
non-fraudulent or non-reckless intent.152 While South Cherry urged that 
Hennessee’s failure to conduct due diligence was motivated by the fact that 
Hennessee wanted to receive a recommendation fee without incurring the 
expense of due diligence, the Court reasoned that it was at least as 
compelling to infer that Hennessee was simply negligent in discovering the 
truth about Bayou.153 The Court explained that Hennessee, priding 
themselves on their expertise in recommending funds, was not likely to risk 
its reputation deliberately by conducting little inquiry on a recommended 
fund.154  
V. ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the PSLRA’s 
pleading standards. Nevertheless, the Court failed to correctly apply those 
standards when it determined that South Cherry had not met the scienter 
requirements imposed by Rule 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.155 In light of 
 147. See id. at 114 (holding that the allegations in the complaint did not give rise to conscious 
recklessness). See also Decker v. Masser-Ferguson, 681 F.2d 111 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
 148. Decker, 681 F.2d 111 at 119. 
 149. Id.  
 150. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 114. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 111 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)). 
 153. Id. at 113. 
 154. Id.  
 155. See infra Part V.A. 
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numerous recently uncovered fraudulent schemes in the financial services 
industry,156 it is clear that the public interest is best served by affording 
investors greater opportunities to prosecute securities fraud claims. All 
circuits should uniformly adopt the Second Circuit’s motive and 
opportunity or recklessness requirements to effectively deter frivolous 
securities fraud claims while empowering defrauded investors to bring 
legitimate claims.157  
  
A. Congress Intended to Uniformly Impose Heightened Pleading Standards 
on all Circuits by Codifying the Second Circuit’s Pre-PSLRA Scienter 
Requirements 
 
Legislative history and the plain language of the PSLRA indicate 
Congress’s intent to codify the securities fraud pleading standards 
developed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that require plaintiffs to 
show motive and opportunity or conscious recklessness in order to satisfy 
scienter.158 At the time the PSLRA was passed, the Second Circuit’s 
pleading standards were the most stringent.159 Uniform federal application 
of these pleading standards fit Congress’s purpose of significantly 
heightening national securities fraud pleading standards.160 In addition, the 
PSLRA’s requirement that plaintiffs plead scienter with particularity of 
facts tweaked the Second Circuit’s standard to prevent plaintiffs from 
bringing generalized “motive and opportunity” claims.161 
 156. See generally, U.S. v. Stanford, 341 Fed. App’x. 979 (5th Cir. 2009); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Bernard L. Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Civ. 08 CV 10791 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 157. See id.   
 158. Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments 
Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1024–25 (1998) 
(discussing Congress’s legislative intent to codify the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pleading 
standards and quoting President Clinton’s veto message that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
had “the highest standard of any Federal circuit court”); see supra Part III. B(a).  
 159. 141 Cong. Rec. H15, 215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (President Clinton, in 1995, stated that 
he was “prepared to support the high pleading standards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit—the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court”); see also supra Part 
III.B.a. 
 160. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litg., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“In many 
jurisdictions, adoption of a ‘strong inference’ standard will substantially heighten the barriers to 
pleading scienter, a result Congress expressly intended.”). 
 161. Id. at 535.  
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The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs stated 
that the PSLRA pleading standard was “modeled upon the pleading 
standard of the Second Circuit.”162  Legislative history indicates that the 
language adopted by Congress in the PSLRA is based in part on the Second 
Circuit’s pre-PSLRA pleading standards.163 Congress also stated that it 
found the body of law regarding the strong inference requirement 
“instructive.”164  
The Committee also reported that courts may find the Second Circuit’s 
body of law instructive.165 President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA, stating that 
he was not prepared to require more procedural hurdles than those imposed 
by the Second Circuit.166 Although Congress eventually overrode the 
President’s veto, many legislators reaffirmed the fact that the PSLRA was 
intended to codify the Second Circuit standard.167 The SEC also filed 
amicus briefs to several court of appeals cases litigating the PSLRA 
standards.168 The briefs stated that Congress intended to adopt the Second 
Circuit’s pleading standards.169  
Finally, the plain language of the PSLRA mirrors that of the Second 
Circuit.170 The “strong inference” of scienter language in the PSLRA is 
identical to the language set out in Second Circuit case law.171 For example, 
in Acito v. IMCERA Group Inc.,172 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that “plaintiffs must also allege facts that give a strong inference of 
scienter.”173 Similarities between the PSLRA’s “strong inference” language 
and the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit “strong inference” pleading standard 
reaffirm the idea that the PSLRA was modeled after the Second Circuit’s 
scienter pleading requirements.174 In contrast, the PSLRA’s language 
 162. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104–369, at 41 (1995). 
 163. Id. 
 164. S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 15 (1995). 
 165. Id.   
 166. See Walker & Seymour, supra note 156, at 1023.  
 167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 171. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (stating that a plaintiff must state with particularity facts that 
give rise to “a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).  
 172. 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.1995). 
 173. Id. at 53.   
 174.  See supra note 161. 
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significantly differs from the pre-PSLRA standards of the Ninth and Sixth 
Circuits, which did not require strong inference to satisfy scienter.175 
 
B. South Cherry Had a Cause of Action Under Rule 10(b) and 10b-5 
Because Hennessee Made Material False Representations; South Cherry 
Relied on These Representations, and Hennessee Acted with Scienter When 
it Recommended the Bayou Fund 
 
1. Hennessee’s Material Misrepresentations 
 
Similar to TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,176 South Cherry satisfies 
the first prong of a 10b-5 claim because Hennessee’s representations would 
have had immediate importance to South Cherry.177 The fact that Samuel 
Israel III was never head trader at Omega Investments and that the fund was 
being audited by an audit group owned by the Bayou’s principal would 
have been material to South Cherry’s investment decisions.178  
2. South Cherry’s Reliance 
 
Applying the Second Circuit’s reliance elements as set forth in Straub v. 
Vaisman and Co, Inc.,179 South Cherry would be found to have reasonably 
relied on Henessee’s representations.180 A fiduciary relationship existed 
between Hennessee and South Cherry by virtue of Hennessee being an 
investment adviser to South Cherry.181 South Cherry hired Hennessee to 
 175. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 176. 429 U.S. 810 (1976). 
 177. Id. at 449 (noting that a fact is material when there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important).  
 178. See S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2009)  (finding 
that Israel had been a mere clerk prior to forming the Bayou Fund).  
 179. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 180. Id. at 597–98 (3d Cir. 1976) (listing the elements to find reasonable reliance as: 
(1)whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties; (2) whether the plaintiff had the 
opportunity to detect the fraud; (3) the sophistication of the plaintiff; (4) the existence of long 
standing business or personal relationships; and (5) the plaintiff's access to the relevant 
information). 
 181. A fiduciary relationship exists between investment advisers and their investors. Sec Exch. 
Com’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (stating “[t]he Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940…reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship”) Additionally, in an administrative proceeding, the SEC found 
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research the validity of Bayou’s investments specifically because South 
Cherry did not possess expertise in these types of investments; therefore, 
South Cherry would not have had the opportunity to detect the fraud.182  
 
3. Hennessee’s Scienter 
 
South Cherry also satisfied the scienter requirement of 10b-5 by alleging 
that Hennessee knowingly made misrepresentations to South Cherry.183  
Some of Hennessee’s misrepresentations, such as the name of the fund 
auditors, were easily discoverable by Hennessee,184 enough so that 
Hennessee should have known that it was making false representations to 
its clients.185 Therefore, as the court in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock 
Exchange186 similarly concluded, “but for a breach of duty of inquiry, 
[Hennessee] should have had knowledge of the fraud.”187 The Second 
Circuit’s decision in Teamsters Local v. Dynex Capital Inc.188 stated that to 
raise an inference of scienter from failure of duty to monitor, a plaintiff 
must specifically identify “reports or statements that would have come to 
light in a reasonable investigation and that would . . . [demonstrate] the 
that Hennessee “owed fiduciary duties to their clients.” Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release 
No. 2871, April 22, 2009.  
 182. Id. Also, while Hennessee is a secondary actor, investors showed reliance on the 
defendant’s own deceptive conduct so that Hennessee could be held primarily liable. See 
generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (holding 
that in order for defendants that would normally be secondarily liable to be primarily liable, 
plaintiffs must allege that the they relied on the defendant’s own conduct). Finally, even if they 
had been experienced investors, the Court in Straub held that sophisticated investors should be 
able to rely upon the “honesty of those with whom he deals in the absence of knowledge that the 
trust is misplaced.” See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 183. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 184. See infra note 190. 
 185. See S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 102–03 (2d Cir.2009) 
(discussing South Cherry Street’s complaint that if the Hennessee Group had performed any real 
due diligence, it would have easily discovered that Israel had not been head trader at Omega 
Investments and that Hetz Herson & Co. were no longer auditing the fund).  
 186. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974).  
 187. Id. at 374 (holding that because plaintiffs did not allege that defendant knew or should 
have known of the fraud, they did not plead a sufficient claim of securities fraud). 
 188. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
     
SC S! LLC " H G LLC 
254    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
falsity of the allegedly misleading statements.”189  Unlike the plaintiffs in 
Teamsters Local, South Cherry specifically alleged that had Hennessee: 
 
[P]erformed any real due diligence in 2004. . . it would have 
discovered, inter alia, that Israel, prior to forming Bayou Fund, 
had been a mere clerk, that HHCO [Hert Herson & Co.] had not 
been the auditor for any of the Bayou-related funds since 1998, 
and that the new auditor was not independent because it was 
owned by Marino, a Bayou Fund principal.190  
 
4. A Finding of Scienter from Failure of Duty to Monitor is Consistent with 
Recent Case Law 
 
South Cherry Street is similar to Rolf v. Blyth191 and Nathel v. Siegal,192 
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Southern District of 
New York, respectively, held that plaintiffs met scienter requirements by 
showing defendants’ failure to monitor.193 In Rolf, a defendant who 
assumed a duty to monitor by agreeing to act as investor’s broker, reassured 
the plaintiff that the investment adviser was doing a good job by 
recommending investments without investigating the adviser’s decisions.194 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant-broker had a 
duty to determine whether the statements she made to her client had any 
 189. Id. at 196. 
 190. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 103. Additionally, in 2005 the SEC charged the Bayou Group 
for running a Ponzi scheme. The “red flags” that caught the attention of the SEC may indicate that 
Hennessee should have known that statements made by the Bayou Fund to Hennessee were 
obviously suspicious. Both SEC investigations and recent case law support a finding of scienter 
from Hennessee’s failure to monitor the Bayou Fund. See Rachelle Younglai, SEC Charges 
Hennessee on Bayou Hedge Fund Miss, REUTERS, (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com 
/legal/banking-law-banking-finance-regulation/12409453-1.html (discussing the SEC’s charges 
against Bayou for failing to properly review the hedge fund before recommending their clients to 
invest); See infra Part V.A.1–2. 
 191. 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 192. 592 F.  Supp.  2d 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 193. See Rolf, 637 F.2d at 80 (holding that a  defendant’s aiding and abetting fraud satisfies 
scienter); Nathel, 592 F. Supp. 2d. at 465 (holding that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant had 
access to internal documents that would have revealed fraud satisfied scienter).  
 194. Rolf, 637 F.2d at 80. While the Court in Rolf discussed the defendant’s fiduciary duties to 
investor, there is no indication that plaintiffs specifically plead fiduciary duty on appeal. Id. 
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factual basis.195 Similarly, Hennessee assumed a duty to monitor when it 
agreed to perform due diligence and advise South Cherry on its hedge fund 
investments.196 Without performing any of the due diligence it had agreed 
to, Hennessee reassured South Cherry that Bayou was performing well.197 
Likewise, in Nathel v. Siegel,198 the Second Circuit denied a motion to 
dismiss a securities fraud claim, holding that the plaintiffs met scienter by 
showing that defendants, investment advisers, recommended investments 
and assured investors of an investment’s likely profitability and tax benefits 
without proper investigation.199 The defendants in Nathel represented that 
they were knowledgeable about the types of investments they were 
recommending.200 The Court found that plaintiffs successfully pleaded 
scienter by showing a failure of duty to monitor, and therefore recklessness, 
because defendants had “made no investigation into the validity of 
investments, and thus made representations to investors ‘without any 
basis.’”201  
South Cherry successfully alleged a duty to monitor by showing that 
Hennessee failed to perform the most rudimentary due diligence on the 
Bayou Fund by failing to investigate the fund auditor’s name or the 
biography of the fund’s principals.202 Consistent with cases such as Rolf 
and Nathel, Hennessee’s failure to check information that it had a duty to 
monitor shows strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness.203  
 195. Id. at 47–48. 
 196. S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that 
Hennessee agreed to perform “detailed and rigorous five step due diligence process”). 
 197. Id. at 102 (describing how all of the figures Hennessee Group provided to South Cherry 
showed profits that were in fact large losses). 
 198. 592 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
 199. See id. at 459.   
 200. Id. at 463 (stating that they were “very familiar” with the investments that they 
recommended and that they “knew what they were doing”).  
 201. Id. at 463–65. 
 202. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 103.   
 203. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The SEC’s contentions against Hennessee in 
this matter also support their failure of duty to monitor, although they have no bearing on the 
decision making of the Court. Id. In April 2009, the SEC charged Hennessee for failing to 
properly review the Bayou Group hedge fund before recommending their clients to invest. Order 
Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Hennessee Group LLC, Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2871, 2009 SEC LEXIS 1365, at *3 (April 22, 2009). The SEC 
stated that Hennessee violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act by failing to “conduct a 
reasonable investigation into red flags” and  by relying on financial information that Bayou 
handed them, rather than conducting the informed analysis that was advertised to its investor 
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C. South Cherry met the Pre-PSLRA Second Circuit Scienter Requirement 
by Showing a “Strong Inference of Fraudulent Intent or a Reckless 
Disregard for the Truth” 
 
South Cherry’s contention that Hennessee wanted to receive a referral fee 
without incurring due diligence costs satisfies the scienter requirement as 
laid out in Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.,204 where the 
plaintiff “barely” alleged motive, but survived a motion for summary 
judgment in the Second Circuit.205 The Second Circuit has allowed 
plaintiffs to satisfy scienter based on “fairly tenuous inferences.”206 In fact, 
the Second Circuit stated higher scienter standards would make it almost 
impossible for a plaintiff to plead scienter against a corporation.207 
clients  In the Matter of Hennessee Group, LLC and Charles J. Gradante, SEC NEWS DIGEST 
ISSUE 2009–76,  Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2009/ 
dig042209 htm. Section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of  1940 prohibits any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective 
client. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Hennessee Group LLC, 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2871, 2009 SEC LEXIS 1365, at *3 (April 22, 
2009). The SEC also found that Hennessee “decided not to perform any analysis after Bayou 
refused to produce its trading data.” Id. SEC enforcement investigations showed that Bayou gave 
contradictory responses as to who was auditing the fund, after which Hennessee failed to 
investigate Bayou’s responses. Id. The SEC investigation and findings strongly support the fact 
that Hennessee did not actually review Bayou’s information, even in the face of obviously 
“evasive” or “suspicious” statements that Hennessee relied on. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. 
McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.1998) (finding that defendant displayed reckless disregard 
when he disclosed statements to his client that were obviously evasive or suspicious). In addition 
to supporting Hennessee’s failure of duty to monitor, the SEC found that Hennessee had 
“willfully” violated the Adviser’s Act, supporting the South Cherry Street’s strong inference of 
scienter. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Hennessee Group 
LLC, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2871, 2009 SEC LEXIS 1365, at *3 (April 
22, 2009). The SEC’s charges were filed before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
decided the South Cherry in July 2009. In the Matter of Hennessee Group, LLC and Charles J. 
Gradante, SEC NEWS DIGEST ISSUE 2009–76, Apr. 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2009/dig042209 htm; S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 98 (decided on 
July 14, 2009).  
 204. 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 205. Id. at 538.  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. (finding that plaintiff met barely alleged motive and opportunity by alleging that 
defendant wanted to use the funds and that the funds at maturity were in defendant’s control; 
however, the Court would allow the finder of fact to hear the case because otherwise it would be 
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to plead scienter against a corporation that did not involve 
“specifically greedy comments from an authorized corporate individual”).  
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D. In Light of Limited Federal Oversight in the Financial Services Industry, 
the Second, Third and Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of the PSLRA Pleading 
Standards Best Serve the Public Interest 
 
The Second, Third and Fifth Circuits’ application of the PSLRA as a 
codification of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pleading standards 
encourages private litigants to bring securities fraud actions, which help 
regulate the financial services industry.208 Private securities fraud actions 
are a powerful tool for securities fraud enforcement. Private actions against 
hedge fund advisers are particularly important because hedge funds are 
neither regulated nor transparent.209 
For these reasons, the SEC opposed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
heighten the Second Circuit’s standards in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. 
Securities Litigation.210 The SEC has limited resources, and cannot 
prosecute all securities fraud cases, as we have seen from scandals such as 
the Madoff Fund. 211 Therefore, it is essential to supplement enforcement of 
 208. Walker & Seymour, supra note 156 at 1003.  
    209. See Younglai, supra note 186 (quoting a statement made by Antonia Chion, an 
associate director in the SEC’s enforcement division: “The advice that clients receive from 
hedge fund consultants is especially critical when the hedge funds are neither regulated nor 
transparent.”). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
[r]equires regulators to implement regulations for banks, their affiliates and bank 
holding companies, to prohibit proprietary trading, investment in and sponsorship of 
hedge funds and private equity funds, and to limit relationships with hedge funds and 
private equity funds. Nonbank financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve 
will also have restrictions on their proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity 
investments. 
Kristin Brost, Summary: Restoring American Financial Stability, SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/FinancialReformSummary231510FINAL.pdf. 
 210. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). See Herbert E. Milstein, Some Recent Developments in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 5. NO. 21 ANDERLR 12, 1 (2000) (“The [SEC] stands 
unequivocally against the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silicon Graphics.”). Silicon Graphics held 
that the PSRLRA imposes more heightened pleading standards than the Second Circuit’s pre-
PSLRA standards. In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 974. 
 211. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). See Herbert E. Milstein, Some Recent Developments in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 5. NO. 21 ANDERLR 12, 1 (2000) (“The [SEC] stands 
unequivocally against the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silicon Graphics.”). Silicon Graphics held 
that the PSRLRA imposes more heightened pleading standards than the Second Circuit’s pre-
PSLRA standards. In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 974. 
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securities fraud by allowing private actors to bring cases as well.212  
Adopting higher pleading standards, such as the Ninth’s Circuit’s 
requirements in In re Silicon,213 may incentivize securities fraud because 
the risk of private securities fraud cases brought against them would be 
lowered. “If we want to continue to prosecute securities fraud actions and 
give plaintiffs a more even playing field against the naturally closed, 
secretive nature of corporations and their officers,” the Second Circuit’s 
approach to pleading scienter furthers that purpose.214 Private securities 
actions serve as a deterrent to fraud and provide a quick way for investors to 
recover losses. 215 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit sets precedent in securities fraud pleading standards, as 
is evidenced by the PSLRA’s codification of Second Circuit standards.216 
The Second Circuit’s finding that South Cherry failed to plead the requisite 
intent is inconsistent with case law.217 Hennessee’s failure to conduct 
simple due diligence in the face of the Bayou Fund’s obviously suspicious 
statements satisfy the PSLRA scienter requirement.218 Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA pleading standards is 
accurate, and should be uniformly applied in every circuit.219 More 
stringent interpretations of the PSLRA impose unfair procedural hurdles for 
plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims, which run contrary to the purpose 
of the PSLRA and may spawn uninformed investors.220   
 
 212. Id.  
 213. 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id.  
 216. See supra Part V.A. 
 217. See supra Part V.B.4.  
 218. See supra Part V.B.3. 
 219. See supra Part V.A., D. 
 220. See supra Part V.D.  
